

Horse Supply and the Development of the New Model Army, 1642-46

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Abstract:

The debate over whether the creation of the New Model Army represented continuity or change in the supply systems of parliamentary armies has suffered from a lack of detailed research on the Earl of Essex's army. This article begins to redress the balance by examining the supply of horses and saddles to the armies of Essex, Manchester, Waller, and Fairfax in equal depth. Studying Essex's army is vital to our understanding of the origins of the New Model Army. There was more continuity between the two than most historians have assumed, but there were also significant changes in 1645.

The creation of the New Model Army in the spring of 1645 has often been seen as a decisive point in the First Civil War. One of the reasons usually suggested for the army's spectacular successes is that it was better supplied and financed than its predecessors. However, there is little agreement among historians over what, if anything, changed in 1645. The debate has suffered from inadequate comparisons between the New Model Army and the three field armies from which it was formed: those of the Earl of Essex, the Earl of Manchester, and Sir William Waller. Historians who have researched the New Model in commendable detail have not put the same

effort into finding out about its predecessors. Essex's army has been particularly neglected, despite its obvious importance in understanding the origins of the New Model Army.

C. H. Firth was the first historian to examine parliament's military administration and logistics in detail. Firth emphasised the New Model Army's superior efficiency over both its opponents and predecessors, although he described the reorganisation of Essex's army in March 1644 as 'a sort of anticipation of the New Model'.¹ Clive Holmes, in his thorough study of the Eastern Association, preferred to see an anticipation of the New Model in Manchester's army, which 'not only in its personnel, but in its centralized treasury, administration and supply system, foreshadows the New Model Army'.² Holmes still argued that there were significant changes in parliamentary military administration, but he placed them in Cambridge in 1644 as much as in London in 1645. In 1979, Mark Kishlansky took the idea of continuity much further, suggesting that, 'in its essential features the New Model departed little from the armies it replaced, providing as much continuity and as little disruption as possible'.³

More recently, Ian Gentles offered a new assessment of the New Model Army which emphasized change over continuity, seeing significant innovation in the methods used to finance and supply the army. Arguing that this was an important part of the army's

¹ C. H. Firth, *Cromwell's Army*, (London, Methuen, 1962, first published 1902), p. 31.

² C. Holmes, *The Eastern Association in the Civil War*, (Cambridge, CUP, 1974), p. 116.

³ M. Kishlansky, *The Rise of the New Model Army*, (Cambridge, CUP, 1979), p. 275.

success, he wrote that: 'Based on prompt payment in cash, this new centralized system soon supplanted other schemes for equipping the army'.⁴ James Scott Wheeler took this view further, explicitly linking parliament's reforms to the concept of the 'military revolution' with his assertion that the New Model Army was 'designed with the best organizational and tactical innovations of the European Military Revolution in mind'.⁵ Wheeler's central thesis was that parliament's financial reforms from 1643 to 1645 helped to decide the outcome of the war, and went on to provide the basis of the state's finance for the rest of the century, allowing England's rise to world power status. In this way, England experienced the military revolution: pressures of prolonged war led to drastic changes in the taxation system, which had a permanent and far reaching impact.

This article will examine the issue of continuity or change in parliamentary military administration and supply systems, using the supply of horses and saddles as a case study. The supply of horses was very important to early modern armies, which used large numbers of mounted soldiers and relied heavily on horse drawn transport. Horses presented some unique problems to military administrators. Horses needed to be fed, watered and shod, and were susceptible to disease and exhaustion as well as being killed or captured by the enemy or stolen by deserters. This meant that a constant supply of replacements was needed. The supply of horses could not be increased quickly in response to increased demand because the gestation period of a

⁴ I. Gentles, *The New Model Army in England, Ireland and Scotland, 1645-1653*, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1992), p. 41.

⁵ J. S. Wheeler, *The Making of a World Power: War and Military Revolution in Seventeenth Century England*, (Stroud, Sutton, 1999), p. 196.

horse is one year, and a further three to four years were required before it was mature enough for military service. Imports of horses during the First Civil War were negligible, but Peter Edwards has shown that surplus horses which would normally have been exported were diverted to military use.⁶ There were more than enough horses in England to sustain the war efforts of both sides. The challenge faced by military administrators was finding a reliable way of gaining possession of them.

Horses also required saddles or harnesses. Since these were manufactured commodities, there was more scope for supply to increase to meet the extra demand. However, cavalry mostly used special types of saddles which were not normally found in civilian use, and this caused a huge surge in demand at the start of the war. In the early years of the war, most cavalry saddles were described as 'great saddles'. These were specifically designed for military use and would not normally have been used by civilians. The saddles used by the New Model Army from 1645 were described as 'troop saddles'. While these were probably not the same as 'great saddles' they were still specialized military designs. Dragoons used lighter 'pad' saddles which were probably similar to ordinary civilian riding saddles. Draught harnesses were less problematic because civilian types were equally suitable for military use.

Parliament started raising an army in June 1642, even before the Earl of Essex was appointed Lord General in July. Despite the passing of the Militia Ordinance, little

⁶ P. Edwards, 'The Supply of Horses to the Parliamentary and Royalist Armies in the English Civil War', *Historical Research*, 68 (1995), p. 50.

attempt was made to mobilize the militia cavalry. Most effort was put into raising new regular cavalry units. This process began on 9 June 1642 when parliament passed an ordinance outlining a system commonly known as the propositions.⁷ The ordinance invited parliament's supporters to advance money, plate, horses, and arms. This was ostensibly a voluntary loan with repayment promised with 8 per cent interest. A central treasury was set up at Guildhall to receive the money and plate. Money was issued from the treasury by warrant of the Committee of Safety or the Lord General to pay soldiers and buy equipment for the army. Included in this was the purchase of between 2,500 and 3,000 horses. Around 70 cavalry troops were created, although not every troop was permanently attached to Essex's field army. The captain of each troop was paid a standard allowance to mount and equip himself and his officers. Commissioned officers were allowed spare horses, so that £280 was allowed to buy 15 horses and equipment for the captain, lieutenant, cornet, and quartermaster.⁸ A further £74 was allowed to buy one horse each for the three corporals, two trumpeters, farrier, and saddler attached to every troop.⁹ Sir Philip Stapleton received £1,485 to buy horses for the 99 gentlemen of the Lord General's life-guard at £15 each.¹⁰ Colonel John Browne was paid £3,000 to mount the 600 dragoons in his regiment, and James Wardlaw probably received a similar amount for his regiment.¹¹ Cavalry captains were also allowed £150 to buy great saddles for their troopers at 50s. each.

⁷ C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait, eds., *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum 1642-1660*, i, pp. 6-9.

⁸ For example The National Archives of the UK (TNA): Public Records Office (PRO) SP28/1A ff. 61, 70, 71, 85.

⁹ For example TNA: PRO SP28/1A ff. 72, 73, 94, 183.

¹⁰ TNA: PRO SP28/2B, part iii, f. 522.

¹¹ TNA: PRO SP28/1A f. 164; TNA: PRO SP16/503/62 f. 62.

Some cavalry troops received an allowance of £600 to buy horses for the 60 troopers in addition to the mounting money for the officers. Only one warrant for this allowance has survived, issued to the Earl of Peterborough in September 1642.¹² Up to eleven other troops might have received this allowance, but the surviving records are ambiguous.¹³ In July 1642, 500 cavalry which had been raised in England and were to form part of an expeditionary force to Ireland led by Lord Wharton were diverted to the Earl of Essex's army.¹⁴ Each captain of the cavalry troops raised for Lord Wharton's expedition had received an allowance of £1,035 'for one months advance for him and his under officers and for the levying of 81 horses for his troop'.¹⁵ Since mounting money, whether for troopers or officers, was always issued from the treasury to the captain of the troop or colonel of the regiment, it is difficult to discover where they bought the horses and how far the allowances reflected actual market prices. There were many opportunities for fraud. Captain Alexander Douglas was found to have received his allowance of mounting money twice, by getting warrants from the Lord General and from the Committee of Safety.¹⁶

¹² TNA: PRO SP28/2A part i, f. 65.

¹³ TNA: PRO SP16/503/62 ff. 61-2.

¹⁴ 'House of Commons Journal (CJ) Volume 2: 30 July 1642', *Journal of the House of Commons: volume 2: 1640-1643* (1802), pp. 696-98. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=8571>. Date accessed: 07 May 2006.

¹⁵ TNA: PRO SP28/144 part x, f. 1.

¹⁶ TNA: PRO SP16/503/62 f. 62.

The majority of the new cavalry troops raised for Essex's army did not receive the £600 allowance to buy horses for the troopers. Instead they were mounted on horses received directly from civilians through the propositions system. The part of the system which dealt with horses was as centralized as the treasury. John Smith and Thomas Richardson were appointed commissaries for listing and valuing the horses brought in to Moorfields by citizens of London and from surrounding counties.¹⁷ Although residents of London and its suburbs probably brought in their horses to Moorfields in person, people from further afield took their horses to the Deputy Lieutenants of their county, who listed them and then delivered the horses and lists to the commissaries in Moorfields.¹⁸ In some counties, horses were listed and issued by local commissaries without passing through Moorfields, but these were small exceptions to what was generally a centralized system.

From June to September 1642 the Moorfields commissaries listed 3,013 cavalry horses for Essex's army, with a total value of £45,898.12s. From October 1642, dragoon and draught horses were also listed. A total of 2,546 were received by the Moorfields commissaries. There are no records of any of these draught horses being delivered to the army until November 1642. A consignment of 80 draught horses from London was delivered to the artillery train at Worcester on 3 October 1642, two days before the commissaries began listing draught horses on the propositions.¹⁹ These are

¹⁷ Cavalry horses for Essex's army were listed in TNA: PRO SP28/131 part iii and dragoon and draught horses in TNA: PRO SP28/131 part iv. Figures in the following paragraphs are all derived from analysis of these lists.

¹⁸ TNA: PRO SP28/131 part iv, front cover of book.

¹⁹ TNA: PRO SP28/262 part iv, ff. 438-9.

the only state owned draught horses known to have been in service before Edgehill, meaning that most of the draught horses would need to be impressed from the countryside. This could partly explain the difficulties encountered in moving the train during the Edgehill campaign. A further 524 draught horses were delivered to the army between 9 November 1642 and 26 January 1643.²⁰ Even this was only half of number of horses required by Essex's artillery train. The deficit continued to be made up by hiring and impressing draught horses.

The horses listed on the propositions often came with arms and other equipment, but this was not a significant source of cavalry saddles. Of the 3,768 cavalry horses listed for Essex's army from June 1642 to June 1643, only 363 were specifically mentioned as having saddles, and only 13 of these were described as great saddles. Another 60 horses came with unspecified furniture. The list of 2,546 dragoon and draught horses included 717 saddles and 179 sets of draught harness.

Propositions contributions declined towards the end of 1642, and were negligible in 1643. Most cavalry horses were listed in July, August, and September 1642. In October the numbers dropped drastically with only 251 horses listed compared to 771 in September and 1,584 in August. Only 136 cavalry horses were listed in November, and after this contributions were reduced to fewer than 100 per month, the final entry being made on 10 June 1643. The dragoon and draught horse list was even more concentrated, with 289 horses listed in October 1642, 2,043 in November, and 141 in December, after which contributions were negligible.

²⁰ TNA: PRO SP28/143 Account of Anthony Fastolfe, f. 30.

As contributions declined, the degree of compulsion in the system increased. On 14 October 1642, the Commons resolved that any persons who did not contribute should be secured and disarmed, and ordered the Lord Mayor and sheriffs of the City of London to search the houses of several named non-contributors.²¹ From 29 November, Parliament taxed non-contributors at a rate of one twentieth of their estates.²² In May 1643, this developed into the fifth and twentieth tax, administered by the Committee for Advance of Money.²³ The committee decided that no horses listed after 29 November 1642 would be counted as contributions.²⁴ By this time propositions contributions were negligible, but the order seems to have hastened the end of the system. The threat of disarmament and assessment does not appear to have been very successful in encouraging people to list their horses. However, disarming of ‘delinquents’ provided another source of horses for Parliament’s army, as well as denying them to the royalists, since any horses fit for military service were taken along with arms. This process began in June 1642, when officials loyal to parliament began impounding horses which were being taken to join the King’s army at York.²⁵ By September 1642 the definition of ‘delinquents’ was widening. Parliament issued

²¹ CJ 2: 14 October 1642, pp. 807-09. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=7092>.

Date accessed: 07 May 2006.

²² Wheeler, *World Power*, p. 102.

²³ *Op. cit.*, p. 103.

²⁴ Calendar of the Proceedings of the Committee for Advance of Money, 1642-56 (CCAM), i, p. 20.

²⁵ CJ 2: 03 June 1642, pp. 601-04. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=4790>.

Date accessed: 07 May 2006; CJ 2: 04 July 1642, pp. 649-51. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=8790>. Date accessed: 07 May 2006.

instructions requiring Lord Willoughby and the Lincolnshire county committee to take 'horses for service' and great saddles, among other things, from all catholics and from anyone who was in arms against parliament; had sent money, arms or supplies to the royalists; had executed the commissions of array; or had subscribed to pro-royalist petitions.²⁶ Soon after this, anyone who had not contributed sufficiently to the propositions was effectively treated as a delinquent. For example, on 24 October the Commons ordered that three men were to be imprisoned for refusing to contribute, and sent for two Norfolk clergymen 'as delinquents' for failing to contribute themselves and for discouraging others from contributing.²⁷

In November 1642, requisitioning of horses went even further beyond the opponents of parliament. On 15 November several people, including Thomas Browne, Maxemilian Bard, and the horse dealer John Stiles, were appointed commissaries by Parliament and given the power to seize any horses in the City of London, and within five miles of the City, which had not already been listed.²⁸ These horses were to be valued and listed, and the value was to be repaid in a similar manner to the propositions, if the owners were thought fit to be repaid. The activities of these commissaries resulted in many complaints, particularly when they took horses from

²⁶ 'House of Lords Journal (LJ) Volume 5: 27 September 1642', *Journal of the House of Lords: volume 5: 1642-1643* (1802), pp. 373-75. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=34911>. Date accessed: 07 May 2006.

²⁷ CJ 2: 24 October 1642, pp. 820-22. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=6052>. Date accessed: 07 May 2006.

²⁸ CJ 2: 15 November 1642, pp. 850-52. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=6960>. Date accessed: 07 May 2006.

people who claimed the protection of parliamentary privilege, and their powers were revoked on 26 January 1643.²⁹ Fragments of lists which appear to be consistent with the activities of these commissaries and the disarming of delinquents suggest that at least 700 horses were seized in and around London from November 1642 to January 1643.³⁰

In the spring and summer of 1643, Essex's army faced a crisis of supply, particularly, but not only, the supply of horses. Parliament did not have a large or reliable source of revenue at this time, and resources were increasingly diverted from Essex's army to various local and regional forces. The shortage of money had a particularly severe impact on the supply of horses, which became a very low priority for spending. This might have been the result of an assumption that horses could be procured in other ways. However, the propositions contributions no longer supplied enough remounts for the army and no new system had been created to take their place. The Sequestration Ordinance was largely irrelevant to horse supply. Horses were already included in the powers to disarm delinquents which had existed since 1642. The few horses mentioned in sequestration inventories from 1643 were of low value and were often described as colts or old horses, which were unfit for military service.³¹ The army had no alternative to arbitrary requisitioning of horses from any civilians who had them. Essex used his powers as Lord General to issue warrants to

²⁹ CJ 2: 26 January 1643, pp. 942-45. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=8514>.
Date accessed: 07 May 2006.

³⁰ TNA: PRO SP28/3A part ii, ff. 188-92; TNA: PRO SP28/5 ff. 227-30, 256-7; TNA: PRO SP28/144 part i, ff. 40-54; TNA: PRO SP28/237 unfol.

³¹ For example, TNA: PRO SP28/217A part ii, ff. 170, 205v.

his officers allowing them to seize horses when they needed to. In practice little care was taken to determine whether the owners were delinquents. This activity is difficult to quantify, but there are many individual examples. Captain Lionel Copley admitted in his account that in June 1643 he had taken four horses in Marlow from ‘such as were reputed malignants’, by virtue of a warrant from the Lord General.³² Colonel Arthur Goodwin led a force of cavalry into the country around Oxford on 26 March 1643 to round up horses and other livestock.³³ This activity is apparent in the accounts of Buckinghamshire parishes near Oxford. Goodwin’s men were alleged to have taken five horses from Ickford worth £34 and another seven from Worminghall worth £40.³⁴ In these cases, no warrant was produced since the inhabitants of both villages said they did not know by what authority the horses were taken.

Horse seizures were unpopular, but they were a military necessity since parliament made no other provision for remounts. However, many soldiers abused the system for their own profit. There were many accusations of soldiers taking bribes in order to release horses. For example, John and William Mayne of Waddesdon, Buckinghamshire, claimed that some soldiers, probably belonging to Essex’s army, took a horse from them and forced them to pay 10s. to get it back.³⁵ The areas where the army was quartered, particularly in the Thames valley, suffered most from horse seizing, but sometimes the Lord General sent his officers further afield. In the spring

³² TNA: PRO SP28/147 part ii, f. 299.

³³ I. G. Philip ed., ‘Journal of Sir Samuel Luke’, *Oxfordshire Record Society*, 29 (1950), p. 45.

³⁴ TNA: PRO SP28/39 part v, f. 591; TNA: PRO SP28/149 part i, f. 6.

³⁵ TNA: PRO SP28/130 part i, f. 39.

of 1643, Lionel Copley mounted a new cavalry troop on horses taken in Norwich.³⁶ Meanwhile, Colonel Walter Long was sent into the county of Essex to collect tax arrears and requisition horses, which resulted in complaints from the local authorities that he was taking horses from parliamentary supporters and releasing horses for money.³⁷ Even more controversy was caused by the radical Member of Parliament Henry Marten, who was given a commission by the Lord General to raise a regiment of cavalry. This commission authorized him to requisition horses in and around London. Like Brown and Bard, Marten made a habit of breaching parliamentary privilege by taking horses from peers, their wives, and servants of parliament. In May 1643, Marten and his men took six horses from the Countess Rivers. The Lords ordered the horses to be restored, maintaining that as the wife of a peer, the countess was protected by parliamentary privilege, but the Commons twice resolved that Marten should keep the horses.³⁸

In response to complaints about Essex's officers, Parliament attempted to place restrictions on his powers. An ordinance passed on 10 May stated that any officer commissioned to take horses could only do so with the consent and supervision of the

³⁶ TNA: PRO SP28/258 part ii, f. 157.

³⁷ C. Holmes, 'The Affair of Colonel Long: Relations Between Parliament, the Lord General and the County of Essex in 1643', *Transactions of the Essex Archaeological Society*, 3rd series, 2 (1970), p. 211.

³⁸ LJ 6: 8 May 1643, pp. 35-7. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=37240>. Date accessed: 07 May 2006; CJ 3: 8 May 1643, pp. 74-7. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=6456>. Date accessed: 07 May 2006; CJ 3: 17 May 1643, pp. 88-91. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=10707>. Date accessed: 07 May 2006.

local Deputy Lieutenants.³⁹ This was superseded by another ordinance on 29 May to the effect that the Lord General was to request remounts from the county committees, who would provide the horses and deliver them to the army.⁴⁰ This had little effect in practice. Essex complained that the counties failed to supply him with the horses he needed and that his cavalry was too weak to fight the royalists adequately.⁴¹

Purchases of saddles continued throughout 1643, despite the fact that very few, if any, horses were purchased for Essex's army in the same period. While horses could be taken from civilians with varying degrees of legality and force, there was no alternative to buying military saddles from specialist manufacturers. Despite Essex's complaints about lack of funding for the army, several warrants issued for buying saddles in 1643 were paid very quickly, although the dates of delivery are unknown.⁴² As in 1642, the money was usually paid directly to the captain of the troop, so there is very little evidence of how it was spent. The Ordnance Office at the Tower of London sometimes issued saddles to army officers but this was quite unusual. A total of 314 saddles were issued from November 1642 to March 1643.⁴³ These were possibly among the equipment left over from the Bishops' Wars, which had been removed

³⁹ Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, i, pp. 155-6.

⁴⁰ *Op. cit.*, i, 162-3.

⁴¹ Bodleian Library, Tanner MS 62/1a, f. 126; LJ 6: 11 July 1643, pp. 127-28. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=37292>. Date accessed: 07 May 2006.

⁴² For example TNA: PRO SP28/7 ff. 63, 82, 438; TNA: PRO SP28/9 ff. 228, 238; TNA: PRO SP28/264 f. 211.

⁴³ TNA: PRO WO55/387 ff. 38, 42, 64, 78.

from the magazine at Hull in 1642. There were no more issues of saddles by the Ordnance Office for the remainder of 1643 or in 1644.

In the first half of 1643, Waller's western army and Lord Grey's army of the Eastern Association came into existence. Very few administrative records have survived for these armies, making it difficult to determine exactly where they got their horses from. Requisitioning horses from civilians seems to have played a significant role in the Eastern Association. In January 1643, the Deputy Lieutenants of Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, and Cambridgeshire were given power to seize the horses and arms of non-contributors.⁴⁴ The sheriffs of Norwich were given similar powers which also covered catholics and any person who had publicly spoken against parliament.⁴⁵ On 30 March 1643, the Hertfordshire committee paid £1 for writing 50 warrants for bringing in horses.⁴⁶ Individual officers in Lord Grey's army were also given commissions to requisition horses. Oliver Cromwell and some of his subordinate officers were specifically named in an ordinance of Parliament which authorized them to seize horses.⁴⁷ The controversy surrounding Colonel Long's operations in Essex was complicated by the fact that another group of soldiers was taking horses in the same area by virtue of a warrant from Lord Grey. Long, claiming that these men were

⁴⁴ CJ 2: 24 January 1643, pp. 940-42. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=6745>.

Date accessed: 07 May 2006.

⁴⁵ LJ 5: 31 January 1643, pp. 583-84. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=35015>.

Date accessed: 07 May 2006.

⁴⁶ TNA: PRO SP28/231 unfol.

⁴⁷ Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, i, 138.

actually committing the abuses of which he had been accused, arrested them and took the 30 horses they had requisitioned.⁴⁸

In July 1643, Parliament decided to raise a new 'flying army' of cavalry and dragoons, to be commanded by the Earl of Manchester. Essex's army was still left without an adequate supply of horses, and the focus on raising a new army would divert more resources. Parliament made an attempt to revive the propositions by inviting voluntary contributions of horses, ammunition, and money for the armies of Essex, Waller, and Lord Fairfax, with repayment promised in the future.⁴⁹ The commissaries' lists show that propositions contributions had come to a halt by this time, and the renewed appeal did nothing change this. A letter from the council of war of Essex's army claimed that the army was still short of horses, money, clothing, recruits, and arms, which 'will be the destruction and overthrow of this army'.⁵⁰ A few days later, the Commons resolved that money should be provided to buy 500 horses for Essex's army at £10 each, but there is little evidence that this was put into practice.⁵¹

⁴⁸ British Library, Egerton MS 2646 f. 188; British Library, Egerton MS 2651 ff. 138-139.

⁴⁹ CJ 3: 17 July 1643, pp. 168-71. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=10043>.
Date accessed: 07 May 2006.

⁵⁰ LJ 6: 22 July 1643, pp. 144-46. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=37302>.
Date accessed: 07 May 2006.

⁵¹ CJ 3: 24 July 1643, pp. 179-81. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=4116>.
Date accessed: 07 May 2006.

The ordinance to raise the flying army was passed on 25 July 1643.⁵² It required that 6,500 horses, with riders and equipment, be levied from the counties under Parliament's control. The quota was treated as an assessment, being divided between the various divisions, hundreds, and parishes of a county. Each parish would provide either horses or money to buy horses and equipment. For example, the parish of Thundridge in Hertfordshire delivered a horse worth £15.5s.6d. to Sir John Norwich, a colonel under the Earl of Manchester.⁵³ A sum of £32.12s. was collected in Chelsea, Middlesex, to provide two horses. These horses were bought for £13.3s., with £12 put towards pay for the riders, and the remainder spent on saddles, helmets, swords, pistols, and holsters.⁵⁴ Prices paid by Middlesex parishes for saddles varied from 10s. to £3, but there is no evidence of where the saddles were bought.⁵⁵ The county committee in Essex sent an officer to London to buy horses for their quota. He contracted to buy 60 horses at £10 each from the Smithfield dealer John Stiles, who required part payment in advance.⁵⁶ Other horses were requisitioned from civilians to fulfil the Essex quota. Captain Nathaniel Rich took horses from several inhabitants of Essex parishes to recruit the Earl of Manchester's regiment, but this was done with the consent of the committee and Deputy Lieutenants, and the owners were often repaid the value of the horses at a later date out of the money assessed on the county.⁵⁷ The Essex committee bought 90 saddles from John Gower, a London saddler, around this

⁵² Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, i, 215-9.

⁵³ TNA: PRO SP28/10 f. 46.

⁵⁴ TNA: PRO SP28/166 unfol.

⁵⁵ TNA: PRO SP28/163 unfol.; TNA: PRO SP28/165 part iv, f. 421; TNA: PRO SP28/166 unfol.

⁵⁶ TNA: PRO SP28/227 unfol.; British Library, Egerton MS 2647, f. 84.

⁵⁷ TNA: PRO SP28/227 unfol.

time, which were probably intended for the levied horses.⁵⁸

The levies were a moderate success, but the results were less impressive than originally intended. The county of Essex fulfilled its quota of 500 cavalry very quickly, despite being subjected to an extra levy to raise 1,000 dragoons for the Earl of Manchester in August.⁵⁹ This success was attributable to the fact that the Essex committee provided the horses in advance rather than waiting for the assessment to come in. Other county committees were unable or unwilling to do so. Significant arrears were recorded in Middlesex, and on 1 September the Deputy Lieutenants were given the power to imprison defaulters.⁶⁰ The Kent and Surrey committees failed to put the ordinance into effect immediately and received a stern reminder to do so on 13 September. A letter sent to the Hertfordshire committee on the same day acknowledged that the county had met part of the quota but demanded that the outstanding arrears be made up.⁶¹ The situation was complicated in August 1643, when the Earl of Manchester was appointed to command the Eastern Association in place of Lord Grey. Initially, Manchester was to remain commander of the entire flying army, but supporters of Essex and Waller in Parliament began to demand a share of the horses for their armies. Waller had lost most of his western army at the

⁵⁸ TNA: PRO SP28/227 unfol.

⁵⁹ Bodleian Library, Tanner MS 62/1b, f. 285; Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, i, p. 245.

⁶⁰ TNA: PRO SP28/163 unfol.; TNA: PRO SP28/165 part iv, ff. 400, 418, 421; CJ 3: 01 September 1643, pp. 224-25. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=8395>. Date accessed: 07 May 2006.

⁶¹ CJ 3: 13 September 1643, pp. 238-40. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=6698>. Date accessed: 07 May 2006.

battle of Roundway Down in July. The remnants of his cavalry were quartered in Middlesex for the rest of the summer and played no part in the remaining campaigns of 1643. In August, Waller sent several of his officers into Hertfordshire with warrants authorising them to requisition horses for his army.⁶² Meanwhile, the Earl of Essex was still short of horses. When his army marched to relieve Gloucester in August, it was reinforced by Colonel Harvey's cavalry regiment from the London Militia.

On 12 August 1643, the London Militia Committee ordered Captain Charles Ghesté to take up 1,000 horses towards the quota of 1,500 set on London and Middlesex, and deliver them to Waller.⁶³ One month later, the Commons ordered that all the horse raised in the counties south of the Thames should be placed under Waller's command, pre-empting his appointment to command the Southern Association on 4 November.⁶⁴ About the same time, the Earl of Essex was given the remainder of the horses to be raised in Hertfordshire, Middlesex, and Buckinghamshire.⁶⁵ By this time Manchester had already had most of the horses that these counties would contribute, leaving the Lord General with arrears that were difficult to collect, if they came in at all. It was

⁶² TNA: PRO SP28/9 f. 390; TNA: PRO SP28/155 unfol.; TNA: PRO SP28/231 unfol.

⁶³ Calendar of State Papers Domestic (CSPD), 1641-3, p. 476.

⁶⁴ CJ 3: 12 September 1643, pp. 237-38. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=5117>. Date accessed: 07 May 2006.

⁶⁵ CJ 3: 03 October 1643, pp. 262-63. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=5050>. Date accessed: 07 May 2006; LJ 6: 28 November 1643, pp. 314-16. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=37398>. Date accessed: 07 May 2006; TNA: PRO SP28/127 part iv, f. 40v.

May 1644 by the time that the parish of South Mimms delivered its two outstanding horses to Sir Robert Pye, a captain in Essex's army, whereas they had already paid £18.6s. to Captain John Alford of Manchester's army in August 1643.⁶⁶ Alford had received all of the horses and money raised in Harrow in 1643.⁶⁷ In Buckinghamshire the collection of arrears for the Lord General was not put into effect until December 1643 and proceeded slowly. The collectors for the Chiltern hundreds later recalled that there were not many horses brought in.⁶⁸ Captain Richard Grenville eventually received 20 horses for his troop between February and June 1644.⁶⁹

In the spring of 1644, large scale purchase of horses began to replace other sources of supply. In March 1644, Essex's army made a contract with the Smithfield horse dealers John Stiles, Harvey Conway, and Richard Clough to supply 1,000 troop horses at £9 each. The sum of £1,000 was paid in advance, with several more instalments in April and May.⁷⁰ The money was paid from a loan of £20,000 secured against future excise receipts.⁷¹ Parliament attempted to provide constant funding for the army by creating a new monthly assessment, which Wheeler described as 'the prototype for the monthly assessment passed in 1645 to support the New Model

⁶⁶ TNA: PRO SP28/165 part iv, f. 400v.

⁶⁷ TNA: PRO SP28/168 unfol.

⁶⁸ TNA: PRO SP28/127 part iv, f. 40v.

⁶⁹ TNA: PRO SP28/149 part ii, f. 184v.

⁷⁰ TNA: PRO SP28/14 part ii, f. 243; TNA: PRO SP28/14 part iii, ff. 292, 327, 362, 387; TNA: PRO SP28/15 part i, f. 110; TNA: PRO SP28/15 part ii, ff. 139, 156.

⁷¹ Wheeler, *World Power*, p. 180.

Army'.⁷² However, purchases of horses were not sustained throughout the year, suggesting that finances were still inadequate.

An alternative scheme was implemented to supply draught horses for Essex's artillery train in April 1644. Quotas were set on counties to raise a total of 800 horses, although unlike the 1643 levies, the county committees were promised reimbursement by Parliament at a rate of £7 per horse.⁷³ The counties of Essex, Hertfordshire, and Surrey were active in providing horses but other counties had to be reminded again and probably failed to bring in their full quotas.⁷⁴ There is no record of the promised reimbursement being made. The army continued to rely on hiring and impressment. The accounts of the artillery train show that in May 1644 there were only 613 state owned draught horses in service, with 185 drivers and 12 quartermasters to look after them. These were supplemented by 179 horses hired on a long term basis at the rate of 2s.6d. per day, and around 300 horses temporarily impressed 'out of the several hundreds upon our march', whose drivers were allowed 1s. per day.⁷⁵

Essex's cavalry mustered at Tiverton on 11 July 1644 with a strength of 2,331 men in six regiments, averaging 73 men per troop, with Colonel Harvey's militia regiment

⁷² Op. cit., p. 181.

⁷³ CSPD, 1644, pp. 114-5.

⁷⁴ TNA: PRO SP28/144 unfol.; CJ 3: 15 April 1644, pp. 459-60. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=5498>. Date accessed: 07 May 2006.

⁷⁵ TNA: PRO SP28/146 f. 183.

bringing the total strength up to 2,720.⁷⁶ Heavy losses were sustained in Cornwall. When the army surrendered at Lostwithiel in September, the entire artillery train, including all of its draught horses, was handed over to the royalists. Although the army was re-equipped when it returned to Portsmouth, there is no record of any horses being bought at this time. Essex was given special powers to seize horses in the western counties, but considered that this would be of little use since there were so few horses left in these areas.⁷⁷

Warrants continued to be issued to individual captains to buy saddles for their troops in 1644, but it became increasingly common for the money to be issued to the colonel of a regiment or direct to the saddler who supplied the saddles. Where the saddlers can be identified they were all based in London, with Daniel Potter being the largest supplier.⁷⁸ By the spring of 1644, the price of a great saddle had fallen to 20s, compared with 30s. in 1643. This fall in prices was a general trend seen in most military equipment as a result of supply catching up with demand.⁷⁹

The Eastern Association committee was given its own central treasuries at Cambridge in early 1644 and allowed to impose a monthly assessment on the counties

⁷⁶ Richard Symonds, ed. C. E. Long and I. Roy, *Diary of the Marches of the Royal Army*, (Cambridge, CUP, 1997), p. 73.

⁷⁷ CSPD, 1644-5, pp. 6, 511.

⁷⁸ TNA: PRO SP28/15 part ii, ff. 141, 143.

⁷⁹ P. Edwards, *Dealing In Death: The Arms Trade and the British Civil Wars, 1638-52*, (Stroud, Sutton, 2000), p. 72.

under its control.⁸⁰ This money allowed the committee to buy horses for Manchester's army, but their system was very different from Essex's army. Commissaries were sent out to buy horses directly from civilians rather than going through dealers. The most prominent of these commissaries was Lieutenant Russell, who was issued with large sums of money from the Cambridge treasury in the early months of 1644 to buy horses for the army. Russell was paid £1,167.18s.6d. in February, £1,000 in April, and £1,410 in May for unspecified numbers of horses.⁸¹ The commissaries appear to have organized their own private sales, and rarely visited horse fairs.⁸² Prices paid were generally lower than those charged by the Smithfield dealers. The 52 horses bought for the troops of Captain Bethell and Major Wild at Huntingdon in April 1644 averaged around £6 each, as did the 115 horses bought for Sir John Norwich's regiment in July.⁸³

Although the Cambridge committee operated a centralized system, the treasury sometimes issued money to army officers to allow them to buy horses for their troopers, as was the case with Essex's army in 1642. This could be a large sum paid in advance, such as the £500 paid to Colonel Francis Russell to recruit his troop in April 1644.⁸⁴ In other cases, officers were entitled to smaller, more specific sums to reimburse them for horses they had already bought for their troopers, such as £12 due

⁸⁰ Wheeler, *World Power*, p. 181; Holmes, *Eastern Association*, p. 127.

⁸¹ TNA: PRO SP28/24 part ii, ff. 187, 213, 229, 270; TNA: PRO SP28/24 part iii, ff. 283, 301, 309; TNA: PRO SP28/25 part iv, f. 547.

⁸² Edwards, 'Supply of Horses', pp. 61-2.

⁸³ TNA: PRO SP28/24 part ii, f. 185; TNA: PRO SP28/24 part iv, ff. 503-5.

⁸⁴ TNA: PRO SP28/25 part iii, f. 430.

to Captain Valentine Walton for two horses he had bought in March and April 1644.⁸⁵ The biggest single payment was £1,100 for 110 horses to recruit Cromwell's regiment on 22 July 1644.⁸⁶ At £10 each these were the most expensive troop horses known to have been bought by the Eastern Association. The association committee also bought saddles, with John Gower of London being the biggest contractor.⁸⁷ On 13 May 1644, he delivered 262 saddles at 26s. each, for which he was paid in full four days later.⁸⁸ In August 1644 he supplied a further 540 saddles for Manchester's army.⁸⁹ Thomas Webb, also of London, was due at least £300 for saddles supplied to Manchester's army in 1644.⁹⁰ Local saddlers, such as Richard Hawkstead of Cambridge, James Thompson of Ely, and William Jones of St Albans were also used but they supplied smaller numbers of saddles and were more often contracted to carry out repairs.⁹¹

The records of the Cambridge treasury are not complete, but they suggest that purchases of horses declined in the autumn of 1644, despite the need to replace losses from the year's campaigns. This was perhaps a symptom of a general financial crisis

⁸⁵ TNA: PRO SP28/27 part i, f. 153.

⁸⁶ TNA: PRO SP28/24 part iv, f. 518B.

⁸⁷ This was probably the same John Gower who served as a captain in Manchester's foot regiment. The warrants were often addressed to 'Captain Gower', and on one occasion the money was received on his behalf by his ensign.

⁸⁸ TNA: PRO SP28/24 part iii, f. 298.

⁸⁹ TNA: PRO SP28/23 part i, f. 14.

⁹⁰ TNA: PRO SP28/139 part i, ff. 15, 18.

⁹¹ TNA: PRO SP28/18 part iii, f. 303; TNA: PRO SP28/222 part i, f. 106; TNA: PRO SP28/231 unfol.

in the association.⁹² The Cambridge committee supplemented its purchases by setting quotas on the associated counties in 1644. In September, for example, dragoon horses were sent to Huntingdon for the use of Manchester's army, including 100 from Norfolk and 30 from Hertfordshire.⁹³ Officers of Manchester's army continued to requisition horses from civilians when necessary, particularly outside the associated counties. Inhabitants of Oundle, Northamptonshire, claimed that Manchester's soldiers had taken two horses worth £11 on their return from York in 1644.⁹⁴ On 21 September 1644, Richard Haley of Elstree, Hertfordshire, lost a horse worth £4, also to Manchester's men.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, the Eastern Association was generally successful in maintaining an adequate supply of cavalry horses. Manchester's army had nearly 4,000 cavalry in service by September 1644, significantly more than the 2,300 that Essex had mustered before he marched into Cornwall.⁹⁶

The commissaries sometimes bought draught horses, but like Essex, Manchester relied on hiring and temporary impressment for transport. In April 1644, the inhabitants of Achurch, Northamptonshire, were required to provide four carts for four days to carry the baggage of Colonel Montagu's foot regiment from Barnwell to

⁹² Holmes, *Eastern Association*, pp. 160-1.

⁹³ TNA: PRO SP28/231 unfol.; British Library, Add MS 22619, f. 206.

⁹⁴ TNA: PRO SP28/173 unfol.

⁹⁵ TNA: PRO SP28/155 unfol.

⁹⁶ Holmes, *Eastern Association*, p. 236.

Collyweston.⁹⁷ Several parishes in Buckinghamshire had carts and horses requisitioned by Manchester's army in the autumn of 1644.⁹⁸

Unlike the Eastern Association, the Southern Association was never given the power to set up its own treasury, and so the association committee was never able to buy horses for Waller's army in the way that the Cambridge committee did for Manchester's army. However, significant purchases of horses and saddles were made at county level. Charles Bowles, a commissary employed by the Kent committee, bought large numbers of horses for Sir Michael Livesey's regiment. The Smithfield dealer Thomas Crossman supplied 251 troop horses at £8 each between August 1644 and April 1645. Bowles mentioned buying more horses in Smithfield, but he also bought horses from directly from private individuals in Kent and Surrey at various times.⁹⁹ Purchases of saddles show a similar mixture of London and local suppliers. In 1644, Charles Bowles bought 212 saddles from William Pease, 210 from William Deacon, and 30 from Richard Beighton, all of whom were based in London.¹⁰⁰ Bowles also did business with local saddlers in Kent, such as John Gedge of Rochester, and Joshua Allen of Sevenoaks.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, the numbers of horses and saddles purchased were smaller than for Essex's or Manchester's armies.

⁹⁷ TNA: PRO SP28/172 unfol.

⁹⁸ TNA: PRO SP28/150 part ii, ff. 249-52; TNA: PRO SP28/151 unfol.

⁹⁹ TNA: PRO SP28/130 part iii, ff. 65-6.

¹⁰⁰ TNA: PRO SP28/130 part iii, ff. 44, 47, 48.

¹⁰¹ TNA: PRO SP28/130 part iii, f. 45.

Quotas were sometimes placed on the associated counties to supply horses for Waller's army. In December 1643, Parliament ordered the Southern Association to raise 500 horse to form a new cavalry regiment under Sir Richard Grenville.¹⁰² These were divided between the counties in a similar proportion to the flying army levies, with 167 horses to be raised in Kent, 83 in Surrey, 125 in Sussex, and 125 in Hampshire. The middle division of Surrey paid in £100 towards the quota in January 1644.¹⁰³ The association committee was also able to negotiate quotas with the constituent counties. In May 1644, the associated counties were required to provide 500 draught horses, but in return Waller agreed that no horses would be taken by his officers without the owners' consent. Although Waller repeatedly ordered his men not to take horses without permission, problems with horse seizing and associated abuses continued.¹⁰⁴ The Southern Association was much less successful at maintaining a field army than the Eastern Association. In September 1644 Waller claimed that he had no more than 800 cavalry and 150 dragoons, and that there were no draught horses available to move his artillery.¹⁰⁵

In the spring of 1645, all three field armies were amalgamated to form the New Model Army. The establishment of the new field army was intended to include 6,000

¹⁰² CJ 3: 20 December 1643, pp. 346-49. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=1432>. Date accessed: 07 May 2006.

¹⁰³ TNA: PRO SP28/300 part iii, f. 727.

¹⁰⁴ J. Adair ed., 'The Courts Martial Papers of Sir William Waller's Army, 1644', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 44 (1966), pp. 219, 220, 223.

¹⁰⁵ CSPD, 1644, pp. 476-7, 489.

cavalry and 1,000 dragoons.¹⁰⁶ Manchester's army supplied more than half of the cavalry. Essex's army probably provided between 1,000 and 1,500, which made up three regiments with some troops from Manchester's army. Waller was unlikely to have supplied more than 1,000 cavalry, which were formed into two regiments. With the men and horses inherited from the old armies, the New Model cavalry was probably close to full strength, but many new horses were needed to replace those worn out by the previous years' campaigns and bring the regiments up to full strength.

The New Model Army had a centralized system of large scale horse purchase in place from the beginning. Contracts were made with a small group of Smithfield dealers: John Stiles, Harvey Conway, Richard Clough, Peter Everard, and Percival Stanley.¹⁰⁷ From April 1645 to August 1646 they supplied 6,723 horses for the army with a total value of £46,196.¹⁰⁸ These horses were delivered to the commissaries John Smith and Thomas Richardson who then issued them to army officers, keeping very detailed records. The dealers were sometimes paid in advance, which was unusual at this time, since most tradesmen contracted to supply the army were not paid until after they had delivered. From July 1645, no more advance payments were made but the horses were usually paid for within two weeks of delivery. In April 1645, Parliament

¹⁰⁶ This figure excludes Rossiter's regiment, which did not normally operate as part of Fairfax's army. Rossiter received saddles through the same centralized system as the rest of the New Model, but did not receive any horses in this way.

¹⁰⁷ For the definitive account of these dealers' careers and influence on the horse trade see P. Edwards, *The Horse Trade of Tudor and Stuart England*, (Cambridge, CUP, 1988).

¹⁰⁸ TNA: PRO SP28/140 part vii. The manuscript erroneously states that the total is 6,708 horses, but this does not agree with the individual entries in the account.

even gave the dealers a one month monopoly on the purchase of horses suitable for cavalry, an unprecedented concession.¹⁰⁹ This shows that the dealers were in a very strong position and were able to dictate their own terms. Some MPs resented this. Bulstrode Whitelocke wrote that ‘the state was cozened’ by the contract.¹¹⁰ The case of horses certainly does not support Gentles’s assertions that the Army Committee drove ‘good or even hard bargains’ and that there were ‘not even any allegations of profiteering’.¹¹¹ Nevertheless, the horses were generally cheaper than those supplied by the dealers in previous years. Cavalry horses were mostly supplied at a rate of £7.10s. each, with dragoon horses at £4. The horses were paid for by the new monthly assessment for the New Model Army, and, initially, by the £80,000 loan from the City of London, which was secured against future tax revenues.¹¹² It was this regular taxation which made a constant supply of remounts possible.

Initially, the Smithfield dealers were only contracted to supply cavalry and dragoon horses, not draught horses. The artillery train required 1,038 horses.¹¹³ In the spring of 1645 Parliament placed quotas on counties to provide 1,056 draught horses for the New Model Army in a similar manner to the levies for Essex’s artillery train in 1644. Parliament agreed that the cost of the draught horses supplied by the counties could be

¹⁰⁹ CJ 4: 4 April 1645, pp. 99-100. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=23361>.

Date accessed: 07 May 2006.

¹¹⁰ B. Whitelocke, *Memorials of the English Affairs*, (Oxford, OUP, 1853), i, p. 417.

¹¹¹ Gentles, *New Model Army*, p. 42.

¹¹² Op. cit., p. 29.

¹¹³ TNA: PRO SP28/145 ff. 60-64.

deducted from their assessments at a rate of £6 per horse.¹¹⁴ In effect this was another loan against future tax revenues, although the trouble of finding the horses and delivering them to the army was also passed on to the county committees. This system was only a temporary measure. In September 1645, the commissaries started to take delivery of draught horses from the Smithfield dealers.

The centralized purchase system was supplemented by other sources but these were much less significant. The Commissioners of Parliament Residing in the Army bought a few hundred remounts from local civilians in the areas where the army was quartered and from soldiers who had taken enemy horses as prize goods.¹¹⁵ On two occasions, the Army Committee allowed money to be paid directly to army officers to buy horses for their regiments. Major Thomas Harrison received £750 on 22 April 1645 to buy 100 horses for Fleetwood's regiment, and Colonel Edward Whalley was paid £1,200 on 31 July 1645 for 160 horses for his own and Fairfax's regiments.¹¹⁶ The reformado officers who made up Captain Knight's troop supplied their own horses, for which they were entitled to an extra 1s. pay per day.¹¹⁷ This troop was a special case, being made up of surplus officers serving in the role of troopers. Ordinary troopers in the other 59 troops did not supply their own horses during the First Civil War. It is possible that commissioned officers supplied their own horses in a similar fashion to the reformados, but the records are unclear. By this time officers

¹¹⁴ Firth and Rait, *Acts and Ordinances*, i, pp. 653-5.

¹¹⁵ TNA: PRO SP28/129 part x.

¹¹⁶ TNA: PRO SP28/21 part v, f. 548; TNA: PRO SP28/29 part i, f. 246.

¹¹⁷ CJ 4: 05 April 1645, pp. 100-01. URL: <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=23362>.

certainly did not receive a special allowance to buy multiple horses as they had in 1642. Non-commissioned officers were sometimes issued with troop horses in the same way as ordinary troopers.

The New Model Army was clearly very well supplied with horses, despite its huge requirements. Even excluding officers' horses, the establishment of the army included over 8,000 horses. The attrition rate from June 1645 to June 1646 was around 63 per cent for cavalry horses and 78 per cent for the dragoons. Fairfax did not complain of a shortage of horses to the extent that Essex and Waller had done. The system which had developed by 1645, funded by regular taxation, ensured an adequate supply of horses throughout the army's campaigns. Even with this system in place, officers occasionally found it necessary to seize horses from civilians. Two Northamptonshire residents claimed to have lost horses to Fairfax's army in June 1645, but these seem to have been isolated incidents.¹¹⁸

The formation of the New Model Army was accompanied by a significant change in the administrative system for the supply of saddles. The Ordnance Office was given responsibility for receiving all saddles from suppliers and issuing them to the army. Like the horse commissaries, the Officers of the Ordnance kept very detailed records. The Army Committee was responsible for negotiating contracts with suppliers and issuing warrants for payment. London saddlers delivered 9,379 new saddles into the Ordnance Office from April 1645 to April 1646, along with another 500 old dragoon

¹¹⁸ TNA: PRO SP28/172 unfol.

saddles which had been sent for repair.¹¹⁹ The average time from the formalization of a contract to delivery of the saddles was just under one week. Unlike horse dealers, the saddlers were never paid in advance, but they were usually paid within two weeks of delivery. The prices of saddles continued to fall in 1645 and 1646. The ‘troop saddles’ for the New Model Army were bought for 17s. to 18s. in the spring of 1645 but the price was down to 15s. within a year. This was almost certainly the continuation of the economic trend which can be observed as early as 1643. The Ordnance Office issued 7,960 saddles to the army from April 1645 to August 1646: a surprisingly high replacement rate.¹²⁰ It could be the result of phasing out of the earlier great saddles, or perhaps the saddles were just not built to last.

The purchase of horse harness was similar to saddles in most respects. Harness makers were contracted by the Army Committee and delivered their goods to the Tower. This was less of an innovation as both the royalist and parliamentary ordnance offices were responsible for procuring and issuing draught harness throughout the First Civil War. Most of the harness delivered to the Tower from 1642 to 1644 was used for Essex’s artillery train. The largest supplier at this time was John Munnings, who delivered 400 sets of harness in May and July 1644.¹²¹ The price of draught harness was much more stable than that of great saddles. Harnesses for Essex’s train were bought for 12s. each in January 1643.¹²² The same price was paid for harnesses for the New Model Army in 1645. It fell to 10s. in December 1645 and

¹¹⁹ TNA: PRO SP28/140 part iii; TNA: PRO WO55/1663.

¹²⁰ TNA: PRO WO55/1646; TNA: PRO PRO30/37/4. The figure includes Rossiter’s regiment.

¹²¹ TNA: PRO SP28/145 f. 47; British Library, Add. MS 25585, f. 69.

¹²² TNA: PRO SP28/5 f. 87.

remained at this level in 1646. A total of 2,004 harnesses were supplied for the New Model Army by nine harness makers, mostly based in the suburbs of London rather than in the City itself.¹²³ Like the saddlers they fulfilled their contracts quickly and were usually paid soon afterwards.

Horses and saddles were very different commodities, and this was reflected in the ways that they were supplied to armies. Civilians owned large numbers of horses which were suitable for military use, and armies tried various means to get hold of them. Only cash purchase backed up by reliable tax revenues proved to be sustainable in the long term, but short term measures adopted before this were by no means complete failures. Essex's army had a well organized, highly centralized, and very successful system for supplying horses in 1642. Although it collapsed towards the end of the year, it would have been entirely sufficient if the war had ended quickly. More horses were bought for cash in 1642 than in 1643. From 1643 to 1645, Parliament developed a new financial system which made it easier to buy arms, equipment, and horses. The supply of horses was influenced by changes in priorities for spending money as well as the amount of money available. In 1643, horses were a low priority, partly because it was believed that they could be procured by other means. The terms of the contract with the Smithfield dealers show that by 1645 the Army Committee considered buying horses to be one of its highest priorities. Purchase was the main source of saddles for all armies throughout the war, because cavalry saddles were specialized military equipment which could not be procured any other way. In this respect they had more in common with weapons, armour, and ammunition, and continued to be a high priority for spending even when money was short.

¹²³ TNA: PRO SP28/140 part iii; TNA: PRO WO55/1663.

There is too much continuity between Essex's army and the New Model Army to support Gentles's idea of a new system supplanting previous schemes in 1645. There was a striking similarity between the recruitment of Essex's army in the spring of 1644 and the creation of the New Model Army in the spring of 1645, both in sources of funding and the system of horse supply. The Army Committee made contracts with the same horse dealers who had supplied Essex's army in 1644. The horses were delivered to and issued by the same commissaries who had been responsible for similar numbers of horses under the propositions system in 1642. This does not agree with Holmes either. While he was correct that the New Model cavalry was dominated by officers and men from Manchester's army, the same was not true of the administrative personnel or the methods they used to buy horses. The system successfully operated by the Cambridge committee was not continued, and the Eastern Association commissaries played no part in procuring horses for the New Model Army. The administrators of Essex's army and the New Model were both based in London and, for horses and saddlery at least, relied on London suppliers. The Army Committee was headed by Robert Scawen, who was previously head of the Committee for the Establishment of the Lord General's Army.¹²⁴

While there was clearly more continuity with Essex's army than has previously been allowed for, this does not mean that Kishlansky's idea of continuity was entirely

¹²⁴ J. Adamson 'Of Armies and Architecture: the Employments of Robert Scawen', in I. Gentles, J. Morrill and B. Worden eds., *Soldiers, Writers and Statesmen of the English Revolution*, (Cambridge, CUP, 1998), p. 45.

correct. Significant changes were made to administrative procedures. The transfer of responsibility for buying saddles and other equipment to the Army Committee and the Ordnance Office represented both innovation and centralization. This centralized system reduced the scope for fraud by individual officers which had existed in Essex's army. Although the system for supplying horses originated in Essex's army, it was developed further in 1645 and proved much more successful. An adequate supply of horses for the New Model Army was sustained for an unprecedented period of nearly 17 months. While it could not be sustained indefinitely, the system of large-scale purchase financed by regular taxation and loans against future taxation lasted long enough to serve its purpose. The development of this system was more subtle and complex than previous historians have allowed, and this article is certainly not the last word. Horses are clearly a special case, and saddles might not necessarily be typical. The possibility of further differences regarding the supply of other commodities needs to be considered. Aryeh Nusbacher has already shown that the successful feeding of Fairfax's soldiers was achieved through a market run by private victuallers more than by a centralized commissariat.¹²⁵ Changes to the administration system demonstrate that the civil war did contribute to the growth of state bureaucracy, but the process was more evolutionary than revolutionary. Many parts of parliament's bureaucratic administration were already in place in 1642. Administrative reforms did not necessarily play a large part in parliament's victory. In the spring of 1644 the armies of Essex and Manchester had significantly different procedures for buying horses, but both systems were successful as long as money was there to fund them. The New Model Army system itself ceased to function once tax revenues began to decline in the summer of 1646. The availability of money was far more important than the

¹²⁵ A. J. S. Nusbacher, 'Civil supply in the civil war : supply of victuals to the new model army on the Naseby campaign, 1-14 June 1645', *English Historical Review*, 115 (2000), pp. 145-60.

procedures for spending it. The Earl of Essex's army played a significant role in the development of Parliament's systems for raising and spending revenue, and deserves far more attention than it has previously received.

