Investigations of a Dog

Previously in cavalry charges: I got as far as what happened when cavalry charged each other. In the English Civil War the two most common outcomes were: one side or the other ran away before they got near each other; or they stopped and fought hand to hand. Hand to hand combat usually resulted in one side giving up and running away sooner or later. This post is about what happened after one side had started running away.

In his history of the wars, the Earl of Clarendon made a very famous generalisation, which I was going to quote but I can’t find a copy of it because Google books has some volumes of his work on full view but not the one I need. His generalisation was that the royalist cavalry usually made successful charges which caused the enemy to run away, but after that they always failed to reform for a second charge, whereas parliamentarian cavalry were more disciplined and could always reform. Therefore royalist cavalry were a one shot weapon which couldn’t do much more than negate their opposite numbers, whereas Cromwell’s cavalry were able to help deal with enemy infantry once the cavalry were out of the way. Some, but by no means all, historians have taken Clarendon’s view too literally. As a summary of what happened at the battles of Edgehill (23 October 1642) and Naseby (14 June 1645), it’s reasonably accurate, and those two battles were arguably among the royalists’ most significant failures. However, most other battles were different.

There were several occasions when royalist cavalry did manage to reform and attack the enemy infantry. At Roundway Down (13 July 1643) the royalist cavalry played the leading role in wiping out Waller’s army. Although their initial charge had little effect, they got the better of the parliamentarian cavalry in the ensuing hand to hand fight. The royalists pursued but then came back to deal with the infantry. This resulted in a stand off because the cavalry couldn’t get through the infantry’s pikes, but the infantry couldn’t move without getting cut up by the cavalry. When the royalist infantry arrived from Devizes, the parliamentarian infantry surrendered.

The royalists suffered one of their most serious defeats at Marston Moor (2 July 1644) but their defeat had nothing to do with a failure of the cavalry to reform after a successful charge. The right wing under Byron put up a hard fight (again neither side was routed during the charge, and the issue was decided by close combat) but eventually ran. As might be expected, Cromwell kept his cavalry under control and they were able to make a second charge later. However, the circumstances of that charge do not support Clarendon’s generalisation at all. After Goring’s cavalry on the royalist left had routed Fairfax’s cavalry with their first charge, some of them pursued and some of them successfully charged the infantry in the parliamentarian centre. After this they reformed in the position initially occupied by Fairfax, to face the second charge from Cromwell, who had brought his cavalry into the position that Goring had started in. Goring’s men were defeated in this second charge, leaving the royalist infantry isolated like Waller’s foot at Roundway Down (although in this case, some of them fought to the death rather than surrender).

Hardly any of the major battles in the First Civil War fit Clarendon’s model of royalist cavalry throwing away their initial success by not reforming soon enough. In every other large engagement that I can think of the royalist cavalry either did reform after their initial success, or didn’t have any initial success to throw away. The Earl of Northampton’s cavalry pursued the defeated parliamentarian cavalry from Hopton Heath (19 March 1643) and then came back to attack the infantry. At Cheriton (29 March 1644), Hopton’s cavalry lost their fight against the parliamentarian cavalry (all drawn from Essex’s and Waller’s armies, so we can even account for it by the genius of Cromwell!). At First Newbury (20 September 1643) the royalist cavalry were on hand to attack Essex’s infantry several times, although without much success.

Edgehill fits Clarendon’s view perfectly, and it might not be a coincidence that this was the only battle he is known to have witnessed himself. The royalist cavalry on both wings routed Essex’s cavalry wings very easily. All of the royalist cavalry, including the reserves who were not intended to take part in the first charge, went off in pursuit of the defeated enemy. It’s likely that the inexperience of both men and horses made the wings difficult to keep under control. If the charge turned into a stampede it would have been difficult to pull up the horses. Men who hadn’t been in a major battle before would have been easily confused in the chaos (see Ludlow’s and Bulstrode’s accounts of Powicke Bridge in Cavalry Charges: Practice for some examples). There might also have been an element of material self interest as some of the royalists went to plunder the baggage train, killing some of the wagoners and setting fire to their wagons. While the royalist cavalry failed to exploit their initial success by reforming and turning on Essex’s infantry, there were up to two regiments of parliamentarian cavalry which had been kept in reserve and which were able to attack the royalist infantry in the rear. What could have been an instant win for the King turned into a draw, and led to a long war.

With this experience behind them, it’s surprising that Rupert and his cavalry apparently made the same mistake at Naseby. It’s even more surprising when you consider that this was the first time since Edgehill that it had happened. While the royalist left was eventually defeated after hand to hand combat with Cromwell’s wing, the right, led by Rupert in person, routed Ireton’s wing in the first charge, pursued them off the field, and then went to attack the New Model Army’s baggage. This doesn’t even look like a case of Rupert letting his men get out of control, as at least one account of the battle says that Rupert himself summoned the train to surrender. I often get impatient with historians whose analysis is based on an assumption that people in the past must have always acted rationally. People do stupid things. Prince Rupert made some decisions which look questionable with the benefit of hindsight. Maybe he shouldn’t have decided to fight at Marston Moor, for example. However, I find it difficult to believe that he would have been as stupid is sometimes implied. I suggested an alternative interpretation in my PhD thesis.

It could be that there was method in the apparent madness of leaving the infantry alone at both Edgehill and Naseby. Attacking the baggage train might not have been all about plunder for personal gain. If my PhD has any value, it emphasises just how vital horses were to the war efforts of both sides, and how difficult it could be to get enough of them. Taking away all the draught horses from the enemy camp and destroying their wagons would have been a crippling blow. Without sufficient transport it would be impossible to move artillery, ammunition, and other supplies. Horses brought away by soldiers would have been their prize goods, but it was usually possible for armies to buy prize horses at less than the market price, and sometimes they were used to replace lost before soldiers could claim them. It’s interesting to note that when Essex’s artillery surrendered at Lostwithiel (2 September 1644), the infantry were disarmed and allowed to march away, but the royalists kept the artillery, including all of its draught horses. When Rupert went for the baggage, he might have been thinking in terms of immobilising the New Model train and gaining more horses for the royalist train. If he was, hindsight suggests that he made the wrong decision. However, if he had brought his men back to the battlefield and reformed them for a second charge against Cromwell, as Goring had done at Marston Moor, he might just have been defeated, as Goring had been at Marston Moor.