Comments on: Mobile Warfare

By: Lafayette C. Curtis

Lafayette C. Curtis — Thu, 18 Oct 2007 07:24:53 +0000

Oh well. I reread the article and found that the lack of tanks that forced the Germans to adopt a more balanced force structure occurred during the early campaigns in Russia, not in Poland or France. That should teach me to (re)read my sources more closely before I go on and (mis)quote them.

By: Lafayette C. Curtis

Lafayette C. Curtis — Thu, 18 Oct 2007 06:34:26 +0000

No, it’s fine now. Thanks for taking the bother of fixing my blunder–I originally kept a copy of the reply with the correct formatting and was planning to post it after you’ve deleted the ill-formatted version, but you’ve spared me all the ahard work so who am I to object? ;)

By: Gavin Robinson

Gavin Robinson — Wed, 17 Oct 2007 19:10:23 +0000

I’ve fixed the link but if you’d like any more changes or you still want me to delete it let me know.

That looks like an interesting article.

By: Lafayette C. Curtis

Lafayette C. Curtis — Wed, 17 Oct 2007 16:14:22 +0000

Ehh…could you delete the comment above? I’m a little embarrassed by the formatting–apparently I got misled by the XHTML guide just above this comment box.

By: Lafayette C. Curtis

Lafayette C. Curtis — Wed, 17 Oct 2007 16:11:33 +0000

Interestingly, the Blitzkrieg myth gets even more complicated when examined from the perspective of modern military studies; I even remember one recent article mentioning that the early German successes in Poland and France were partially due to the fact that they didn’t have enough tanks, with the result that they were forced to deploy their Panzer divisions in a more balanced configuration with plenty of infantry support rather than the inefficient tank-heavy organization they had envisioned in the interwar period. But it’s certainly true that even then the armored units often went too far ahead of the other arms, and this separation sometimes resulted in rather bizarre consequences like supposedly outdated Polish horse cavalry units riding down unsuspecting German infantry who thought they were marching through already-secured routes.

By: Investigations of a Dog » Grand Narratives of the Great War

Investigations of a Dog » Grand Narratives of the Great War — Wed, 31 Jan 2007 19:44:00 +0000

[...] I do have a couple of criticisms. The first is that, while convincingly demolishing just about every myth associated with the First World War, he perpetuates one from the Second World War by frequently referring to something called “Blitzkrieg”. As I said in my post about Mobile Warfare, this is something that went out of fashion among academic military historians around the same time as the old view of the Great War. At the same time as learning about the revisionist reassessment of the First World War, I was also learning that the Germans did not have a coherent or radically new operational doctrine in the early years of the Second World War, and that they rarely used the word “Blitzkrieg” themselves. The other problem is that he is too dismissive of cultural history, contrasting empirical historians who scientifically examine archival sources to get at the facts (looks like I’m not the only one who can unconsciously channel Geoffrey Elton!) with literary critics who study fiction. If you want to get at Paul Fussell you can easily condemn him for privileging the canon, or for using outdated formalist methodology (it’s funny how many betes noires of traditionalists turn out to be followers of the innocuous Herman Northrop Frye rather than Lyotard or Derrida), but to condemn him for studying something which isn’t “true” makes no sense. [...]

By: Gavin Robinson

Gavin Robinson — Mon, 04 Dec 2006 12:30:20 +0000

I’m going mostly by what was the academic consensus 10 years ago, and things might have changed since then. It’s true that radios gave the German armour an advantage and that this was one of the factors which prevented the allies from calling their bluff, but I’d still maintain that the armoured thrust to the channel was a bluff that nearly didn’t pay off. Glyn Prysor’s stuff about fifth column paranoia adds another dimension to the allied collapse. Would more radios have helped to dispel the myth, or would they have just allowed unfounded rumours to spread faster?

Later in the war the allies had more vehicles, better communication systems, and more experience of manoeuvre, which would tend to bring about equilibrium more often. However, there were always situations where no amount of manoeuvrability would do any good. When there were obvious objectives which one side had to take, and the other side knew it, digging in and fortifying was a viable option no matter what Patton said. Once the remnants of the BEF were concentrated at Dunkirk, everyone knew where they stood and what they had to do. The Germans failed to break through in time because the rearguard put up a good fight, and because the terrain was not ideal for tanks.

I’ll get on with writing about cavalry soon.

By: Gary Smailes

Gary Smailes — Mon, 04 Dec 2006 07:13:30 +0000

Your argument regarding blitzkrieg is very interesting. I have always viewed the tactic as far more fluid than many think. I believe that in the early stages of the war, radio communications between tanks gave the Germans a considerable advantage. Later, as this advantage subsided, so did the implication of the so called blitzkrieg tactics.
In regards to Civil War cavalry tactics, what was the basis of the tensions that existed between traditional cavalry tactics and those used on the continent? Was it not the troop�s ability, and relative lack of munitions, that were the key factors on the implication of either tactic?
More posts of ECW tactics please�

By: Gavin Robinson

Gavin Robinson — Fri, 01 Dec 2006 20:27:31 +0000

Capturing the capital city doesn’t always mean instant victory — just see the endless debates about Moscow in 1941 — but London was vital to the parliamentarian war effort as it was by far the biggest centre of population, trade, and manufacture, so they probably would have been lost without it. I don’t think there was a time before the London trained bands were assembled as they existed well before either side started raising regular armies. 1642 was probably the royalists’ best chance to capture London, before the fortifications were built, but there was not much chance of breaking through the combined strength of Essex’s army and the London militia. The royalists were in a very strong position in the summer of 1643, so maybe you could make a case that they should have gone for London instead of Gloucester, but there are so many variables it’s difficult to say how things might have turned out.

I’m planning some more posts about cavalry tactics and shock which should appear in the next few weeks.

By: Battlefield Biker

Battlefield Biker — Fri, 01 Dec 2006 16:23:35 +0000

Great post. I think the English Civil War cavalry tactics are a speciality of yours. Yes? What do you think of Prince Rupert’s view of shock and mobile warfare in relation to this post? I’ve wondered whether Rupert’s desire to do a “Thunder Run” into London early on in the war would have been enough to scare the bejesus out of the population and Parliamentarians? i.e. before the trained bands had been appropriately assembled and armed? Could he have precipitated a Maginot line / Dunkirk moment?