Investigations of a Dog

Feeding an early-modern army was a major logistical problem. The New Model Army had a centralised supply system to take care of most things (weapons, armour, clothing, horses, saddles) but food was a big exception. Aryeh Nusbacher has noted that the quantities of food supplied through centralised purchasing were far too small to keep the army fed (see “Civil Supply in the Civil War”, English Historical Review (115, 2000, pp. 145-60), which summarises some of the most important points in his PhD thesis). His answer to this problem is that food was mostly supplied by private victuallers who brought food from London and sold it directly to the soldiers. This makes a lot of sense, because compared to the population of London (estimates for the civil war period are usually between 200,000 and 300,000), feeding an army of 20,000 was not such a big deal. In contrast, most of the areas where the army campaigned were unlikely to have enough food supplies to support the army. Ben Coates (The impact of the English Civil War on the economy of London, 1642-50, 2004, ISBN: 0754601048, pp. 91-2) questioned this view, partly because Ian Archer pointed out that it would have been difficult for the victuallers to find the army when it was on the move. Having spent years studying military operations and logistics I would suggest the opposite: it would have been difficult to miss an English Civil War field army.

Victuallers setting out from London would have known at least which general direction to go in. Nusbacher suggests that they used existing road networks wherever possible, and shows that before the war carriers had well established routes and timetables. There is no surviving evidence that the authorities explicitly informed victuallers of the last known position of the army, but it’s at least possible that they did. It would certainly have been in their interest to make the provision of supplies as easy as possible. Commissaries in the Eastern Association almost certainly arranged in advance to buy horses from the public in certain towns on certain days. The authorities would have had a good idea of the whereabouts of the army because Fairfax, Cromwell, and the Commissioners Residing in the Army were in regular contact with Parliament and the Committee of Both Kingdoms. Even if this information was not officially made available, word most likely got around. There were many newsbooks and pamphlets containing the latest news of the army (or claiming to — not all were entirely accurate!).

Since the army needed a constant supply of food, victuallers could probably expect to meet other victuallers and carriers who were on the way back to London. There were many other people besides victuallers coming and going from the army. Official convoys were often sent out with money, gunpowder, weapons and other supplies, and usually strong escorts of cavalry. Remounts bought from the Smithfield horse dealers regularly had to be taken to the army, as did impressed soldiers. Communication between Parliament and the army commanders depended on messengers carrying letters backwards and forwards. All these sources of information would help to ensure that the victuallers were going in roughly the right direction.

When they got closer to the army there would be many more clues to help them track it down. It’s very difficult to miss such a large concentration of men, vehicles, and animals. The full establishment of the New Model Army was 14,400 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, 1,000 dragoons, and an artillery train with 30 guns, 132 wagons, and just over 1,000 draught horses. With officers and artillery personnel that comes to over 21,000 men and 8,000 horses. In practice the infantry never reached full strength during the First Civil War and were sometimes at not much more than half strength, but the cavalry and dragoons were usually closer to their establishment. Even 10,000 men and 4,000 horses would be quite conspicuous. Moving a force that size along unmetalled roads would leave very obvious tracks, and local people could hardly fail to notice an army in the vicinity. Scouts often asked country people for information about the movements of armies and preparations for campaigns (see The Journal of Sir Samuel Luke, Oxfordshire Record Society, volumes 29, 31 and 33 for many examples).

There was a good chance of making contact with the army because units would usually have been quartered over a wide area. While infantry tended to be relatively concentrated (although even when kept close together 7,000 or more men necessarily take up a significant amount of space) mounted units would be more widely dispersed. Where evidence is available it appears that cavalry usually followed a rule of one troop (a unit of up to 100 men plus officers in the New Model Army) per village, which means up to 70 villages would be needed to support the New Model cavalry and dragoons. Most of the detailed evidence comes from units in their home areas. Less information is available for armies on campaign near the enemy, and it’s likely that they might have quartered closer together if there was an imminent threat from an enemy army. Nevertheless, the quarters of such a large mounted force could have spread over several miles. Furthermore, cavalry spent much of their time patrolling the areas surrounding the army in order to locate the enemy and protect friendly quarters from raids. There was a good chance that victuallers would meet cavalry patrols on the road. It’s even possible (although I have absolutely no evidence) that patrols were sent out to guide and protect victuallers, since they were vital to the survival of the army.

For all these reasons, I consider it unlikely that victuallers had much trouble finding the New Model Army. A strong counter argument is that civil war generals often didn’t know where the enemy was. The Edgehill campaign is the most well known example, but I tend to think scouting on both sides had improved by 1645. Most of the points I’ve made here are conjectures and are not very well supported by definite evidence, but I think it at least gives an idea of the scale of seventeenth-century warfare and some of the logistical issues involved.

Bibliography

1. Ben Coates, The impact of the English Civil War on the economy of London, 1642-50 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004).
2. Aryeh J. S. Nusbacher, ‘Civil Supply in the Civil War’, English Historical Review, 115 (2000), pp. 145-60.
3. I. G. Philip (ed.), Journal of Sir Samuel Luke (1950), 29, 31 and 33.